我国会计准则制定基础的现实选择

我国于2007年1月1日正式实施的新会计准则体系更多地体现了以原则为基础的特征。但从国际财务报告准则制定基础的内生性、会计准则的形成机理及财务舞弊行为的责任认定等角度来看,我国对于会计准则制定基础的选择,规则基础的会计准则在一个相当长的历史时期内都有存在的合理性。     

系统理论是科学发展的应然逻辑

科学发展的梯度理论是科学发展观的一个新领域。研究这个新领域,有助于对我国改革开放30年经济社会的发展作一全景式观照。坚持科学发展的梯度性,也是改革开放30年我党的一个重要战略。科学发展的梯度理论在于从发展梯度的角度阐述科学发展观,研究科学发展的规律,研究科学发展过程中人与自然、人与社会、人与人、人与自身的问题,关注科学发展的中间过程状态,论证我国经济社会发展的合规律性与必然逻辑,探索科学发展过程的创造性和谐,为科学发展的未来阶段提供理论支持。科学发展的梯度理论把改革开放以来我国经济社会的发展划分为三个阶段：以“反贫困”为特征的经济社会发展初级阶段、以“重效益”为特征的经济社会发展跨越阶段、以“讲和谐”为特征的经济社会发展逐步完善阶段。     

论我国行政处罚听证程序的原则

行政处罚听证程序是正确实施行政处罚的关键。本文在说明了什么是听证以及听证的适用范围后，着重阐述了行政处罚听证程序的原则，即明确告知的原则、有求必听的原则、公开听证的原则、职能分离原则与回避原则、审核听证笔录的原则，以指导行政处罚听证程序的顺畅运行。     

企业技术创新主体性程度的区域差异及其对区域创新能力的影响

在创新系统中,企业是技术创新的主体。从投入、执行、产出和应用四个方面,使用描述统计和聚类分析方法,对我国30个省级区域2005年相关数据进行分析发现,我国企业技术创新主体性程度存在显著的区域差异,它体现在总体水平和结构两个方面。进一步通过回归分析发现,这种差异对区域创新能力有着显著的影响。     

建立合肥旅游协作圈的耗散结构观分析

合肥旅游协作系统可以通过发展成为耗散结构系统。运用耗散结构理论对合肥旅游协作圈的建立进行研究,指出合肥旅游协作圈的建立要遵循开放性原则、负熵流原则、非平衡原则、非线性原则和驾驭涨落的原则。     

Optimal Investment Strategy in Safe-region on Consumption and Portfolio Problem

This paper investigates an optimal investment strategy on consumption and portfolio problem, in which the investor must withdraw funds continuously at a given rate. By analyzing the evolving process of wealth, we give the definition of safe-region for investment. Moreover, in order to obtain the target wealth as quickly as possible, using Bellman dynamic programming principle, we get the optimal investment strategy and corresponding necessary expected time. At last we give some numerical computations for a set of different parameters.     

产业集群的网络创新机制和绩效

产业集群的网络结构是由市场关系网络和社会关系网络叠加而成的复合网络,内含乘数传导创新机制、合作创新机制和创新动力增强机制。在产业集群网络结构的创新机制作用下,产业集群内的企业与集群外企业相比,具有新产品乘数倍增加、创新低风险低投入高成功率、创新成果高速扩散、创新周期缩短等绩效和创新优势。     

The Costs of Implementing the Majority Principle: The Golden Voting Rule

In a context of constitutional choice of a voting rule, this paper presents an economic analysis of scoring rules that identifies the golden voting rule under the impartial culture assumption. This golden rule depends on the weights β and (1−β) assigned to two types of costs: the cost of majority decisiveness (‘tyranny’) and the cost of the ‘erosion’ in the majority principle. Our first main result establishes that in voting contexts where the number of voters n is typically considerably larger than the number of candidates k, the golden voting rule is the inverse plurality rule for almost any positive β. Irrespective of n and k, the golden voting rule is the inverse plurality rule if β ≥ 1/2 .. This hitherto almost unnoticed rule outperforms any other scoring rule in eliminating majority decisiveness. The golden voting rule is, however, the plurality rule, the most widely used voting rule that does not allow even the slightest ‘erosion’ in the majority principle, when β=0. Our second main result establishes that for sufficiently “small size” voting bodies, the set of potential golden rules consists at most of just three rules: the plurality rule, the Borda rule and the inverse plurality rule. On the one hand, this finding provides a new rationalization to the central role the former two rules play in practice and in the voting theory literature. On the other hand, it provides further support to the inverse plurality rule; not only that it is the golden rule in voting contexts, it also belongs, together with the plurality rule and the Borda method of counts, to the “exclusive” set of potential golden voting rules in small committees. We are indebted to Jim Buchanan, Amichai Glazer, Noa Nitzan, Ken Shepsle, and an anonymous referee for their useful comments.     

上市公司年度报告披露准则变迁研究

年度报告披露准则自1994年了台以来，先后曾经历过3次较大的修订。本文通过回顾年度报告披露准则的变迁过程，揭示出其变迁的基本路径，并对其合理性进行了评价，以期为我国上市公司信息披露行为的进一步规范提供有益的思路。     

A class of fair distribution rules à la Rawls and Sen

Summary. This paper discusses and develops “non-welfaristic” arguments on distributive justice à la J. Rawls and A. K. Sen, and formalizes, in cooperative production economies, “non-welfaristic” distribution rules as game form types of resource allocation schemes. First, it conceptualizes Needs Principle which the distribution rule should satisfy if this takes individuals' needs into account. Second, one class of distribution rules which satisfy Needs Principle, a class of J-based Capability Maximum Rules, is proposed. Third, axiomatic characterizations of the class of J-based Capability Maximum Rules are provided. Received: July 30, 1999; revised version: March 11, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal, Professors Marc Fleurbaey, Nicolas Gravel, Ryo-ichi Nagahisa, Prasanta Pattanaik, Kotaro Suzumura, Koich Tadenuma, and Yongsheng Xu for their fruitful comments. An earlier version of this paper was published with the title name, “A Game Form Approach to Theories of Distributive Justice: Formalizing Needs Principle” as the Discussion Paper No. 407 of the Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, and in the proceedings of the International Conference on Logic, Game, and Social Choice held at Oisterwijk in May 1999. That version was also presented at the 3rd Decentralization Conference in Japan held at Hitotsubashi University in September 1997, at the annual meeting of the Japan Association of Economics and Econometrics held at Waseda University in September 1997, and the 4th International Conference of Social Choice and Welfare held at University of British Colombia in July 1998. This research was partially supported by the Japanese Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health and Welfare. Correspondence to: N. Yoshihara